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Terrorism in Civil Society

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Introduction: Yorktown University's web cast on the topic Terrorism in Civil Society

Bishirjian: I am Dr. Richard Bishirjian, president of Yorktown University. You are joining us at the address on the web for a teaching institution dedicated to putting tradition back into education. That tradition includes the history of western civilization, the philosophers of the west whose thinking defines our understanding of our humanity, the philosophy of limited government of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution of the United States and of the exercise of freedom in civil society.

Freedom in America on Tuesday, September 11<sup>th</sup> was attacked, and, thus, all of us were attacked. We learned from that attack that thou we lost thousands of our fellow citizens, the American community is a living reality. We did not lose our country. Indeed, we discovered what defines us and our common love was revealed when members of Congress spontaneously sang A God Bless America.”

With us today are three members of the faculty of Yorktown University who would like to address the important issues of this day. They include Atilla Yayla from Ankara, Turkey, Joseph Martino, of Sidney, Ohio, and William B. Allen of East Lansing, Michigan. I'd like to say a little bit about each of our guest and then start with a question of our guest of Ankara, Atilla Yayla. Dr. Yayla served as the assistant director of the Turkish Democracy Foundation and since 1997 he has been president of the Association for Liberal Thinking in Turkey. His ten books include *On Terrorism, Liberal Approaches, Introduction to Politics, and Islam, Civil Society and Market Economy*. He is the author of numerous scholarly articles and essays including *A Cultural Classes Between Minority and Larger Society in Democracies@* and *AIslam Secularism, Democracy, and Turkey.@* Dr. Yayla is a member of the Turkish Political Science Association and of the Mont Pelerin Society. He teaches democracy in Islamic countries at Yorktown University.

I'd like also to introduce Dr. Joseph Martino. Dr. Martino earned degrees in Physics from Miami University of Ohio, a Masters in Electrical Engineering from Purdue University in Indiana, and a Ph.D. in Mathematics from Ohio State University. Dr. Martino joined the United States Air Force where he served for 22 years, retiring as a full Colonel in the early 1970s. While in the Air Force he was a member of the Plans Staff of both the Air Force Avionics Laboratory and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and was also Chief of the Environmental Analysis Division of the Air Force Office of Research and Analysis. In these positions he was responsible for preparing forecast of critical technologies for future weapons systems. After leaving the Air Force from 1975 through 1993 Dr. Martino became a Senior Research Scientist at the University of Dayton Research Institute where he conducted research for the Army Missile Command Martin Marietta, AT&T, IT&T and the Hobart Corporation. Among his publications is the widely used textbook Technological Forecasting for Social Change. Dr. Martino is nationally known for his knowledge of Just War Doctrine, and his writing and lectures about the application of the Just War Doctrine in the modern world. He teaches two courses on Just war Doctrine at Yorktown University including AWhen Is War Justified@.

Dr. William Allen, our third participant today, is the middle of twelve children born to a Baptist preacher. He studied science at Virginia University in Richmond and then migrated to California to undertake undergraduate study at Pepperdine College and eventually procured graduate education at Claremont Graduate School where he obtained a Ph.D. in government. During his graduate study, he became a Fulbright Fellow. His commitment to liberal education and to public service are the clearest consistent themes in his career. He served on the National Counsel for the Humanities in the administration of President Reagan, and during that administration he became a member and chair of the United States Commission of Civil Rights. He also served on the Hoover Institution and St. John's College and is a Fellow of the Family Institute of Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Formerly the Director of the State Council of Higher Education of Virginia, Dr. Allen was recognized for excellence for liberal education on the 1997 Templeton Honor Rolls. He has also been a Kellogg National Fellow and received the international Prix Montesquieu. He's published ALet the Advice Be Good: A Defense of Madison's Democratic Nationalism.@ He edited several collections, including AGeorge Washington: A Collection@ and the AEssential Antifederalist@ and his newest book *The Federalist Papers, A Commentary*, was published in 2000. Dr. Allen teaches a seminar on the Federalist at Yorktown University and is responsible for a course that studies the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.

Bishirjian: Dr. Yayla, you saw President Bush's address to both houses of the Congress of the United States. How will the Islamic world react?

Yayla: I think it was a very good speech and he made good comments especially on Islam and he says that they respect the belief of Muslims. I believe this to be well received in the Islamic world, but personally I must say that I see some politics there. Yes, he is a politician but he was not right, I think, in referring to regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. I know he has done this due to specific reasons,

but in this country there are also problems. Remember, he mentioned that a man in Afghanistan whose beard is not long enough can be punished. But also, you know, that in Saudi Arabia we do not allow him to drive. So, apart from this point and there is another point I didn't like, he mentioned Fascism, he mentioned Nazism rightly but he didn't mention Soviet communism. Because the most totalitarian regime in the world. But from this point I think it was a very good speech and it will be very well received in the Islamic world. I think.

Bishirjian: And do you think that he has identified the right source of these terrorist attacks?

Yayla: It seems so, but we still need time to be sure, but I think the direction is in general right.

Bishirjian: And, Dr. Allen, over the long term what do you think, let's say the next six months, what do you think that we should be looking for in terms of these movements and activities?

Allen: I look for two perspectives that are important. First is that you are now discussing mainly there must be some clear steps that are taken which will remain, of course, unknown to most of us, known only to the administration itself for awhile. And these should show increasing engagement militarily, and otherwise with those areas where we have highlighted terrorism and what was interesting in the president's speech was last night was he began for the first time in this past few days, to start naming names and places. So we will be getting to see where our forces will be pointed. Second perspective is that which is always present in every large democracy, a democracy of any real consequence, and that is the rise internally of second thoughts and questioning. We all have to be mature enough to recognize it is going to come. That will we have the fabled Monday morning quarterback and that although the President is doing a great job to tell us this is going to be a long struggle. He has asked repeatedly for our patience. We know that he will have to continue doing that because people will be no less impatient with him than they were with Abraham Lincoln.

Bishirjian: Let's go back to the issue of terrorism for a second. Dr. Yayla, you wrote your Ph.D. dissertation on terrorism, did you not?

Yayla: Yes sir.

Bishirjian: And can you tell us in terms of your research in this field and your proximity to the source of what the American president has identified as the terrorists; what do you think we should be looking for in terms of reaction in the Islamic world and also the actions on the part of those accused?

Yayla: Actually, terrorism can be constituted as a modern phenomenon. It has maybe existed in all human history. But you know Muslim life is presenting new targets for terrorists like large buildings like Trade Centers and central heating systems and big cities. So modern terrorism is doesn't like new targets. What puzzles me here is the distinction between an ordinary Muslim and an Islamic terrorist. So my thinking on it is to how to distinguish this from each of us. Let me give you some brief definitions to, that may of help in making this distinction. A Muslim is one who believes in Islam and who tries according, tries to live accordingly. Islam is the one, in my opinion, who believes in Islam and tries to live accordingly but this is not enough for x They also Islam people attempt to make fellow countrymen to live an Islamic lives and this can be done in two ways, traditionally or politically. Traditionally, the way is this; you try to convince other people to live Islam, to believe in Islam, to follow it and this is normal in a society. But if you take political line that means that you are going to use public force to make the people who are already Muslim to live in Islamic life. Political Islamists in political regimes in . They are the main opposition and their main effort is to topple the government and to take over political authority. As it comes to Islamist terrorist the situation is changing here. In addition to being Muslim and part Islamist, Islamic terrorist is the one who believes that by destroying so called great Satan, one can have Islam all over the world. The difference here is this, political Islam believes that to lead an Islamic life you need an Islamic regime in a country. But Islamic terrorists, I think, believes that to live a full Islamic life you have to make Islam dominate all the world. And if you have such an aim the target is obviously the biggest power in the world which is the United States of America. I think this event will have very serious repercussions in all the Islamic world. I think, first of all, the government in Islamic countries with no exception, probably, including Turkey, will use this as a new tool for to further limit individual liberties. This is what I see in Islamic countries and as to Afghanistan I don't know how they think. They are in a very difficult position. They don't want to seem to take step back but, I think, in mid term and in no term they will be probably cooperating with the West. Because they know they are confronting with a very big, very big power.

Allen: Right, may I intrude just a notion here. I think it's really important for us to understand Islamic imperialism in the context of the challenge it poses for unlike the United States and liberal democracy in general there is no reliance upon conversion or persuasion in Islamic imperialism. It is unusual in this sense that to have a highly developed notion of worldwide domination in the modern era predicated on force without any plausible pretext for being able to bring to bear force sufficient to accomplish the aim. We can contrast this is what happens at the American republic when there were terrorists in that part of the world as well who were pirates. They were called the Algerians in those days, and in 1793 it became necessary for George Washington to distinguish from Muslims in general as he talked about the necessity for the United States to do something to rein in their

depredations in that part of the world. You may remember the old slogans AMillions for defense not one cent for tribute@, which is applied as well there as in the “XYZ affair.” What Washington did was to give assurances of the character of the United States as a open society in which even Muslims, as he put it in those terms, were free to enter and worship freely. And he predicated as the Declaration of Independence had done that America’s existence as a defense of her freedom on her preference to rely upon persuasion. So you have this strange conflict between the force at sees itself as imperialistic but will not rely on persuasion or conversion to achieve its aims. Coming up against a nation for which the defense of freedom is of course everything.

Bishirjian: And why does the word irrational came to mind here? If indeed we are dealing with from Western eyes an irrational force it makes the task of containment much more difficult, does it not?

Allen: It certainly does in so far as it allows itself to try to predict their conduct on principles of irrationally. Their aims are irrational, their means are cold-bloodedly rational. I think that the President has done a good job of reminding us of that. It is perhaps not wise for us to call them cowards or crazy when they do the things they do. But you can have cold-blooded rational means in pursuit of wildly rational ends and I believe that is what we are faced with.

Bishirjian: One of the ways my which to track the source of an offensive action is to ask “who benefits”? In terms of what we know and based on the President’s identification of Afghanistan at the very least as the principle supporter of these terrorist actions and the terror network that the referred to as al-Qaeda. Who benefits from this kind of activity? The overwhelming superior force of the Untied States which clearly threatened the Afghanistan government in a way that there is in terms of simple costs benefit analysis there is absolutely nothing to benefit them.

Allen: This is really a hard call to make. And I tried to answer the question myself and perhaps the professors have another response. One thing I have observed is this: In some of the Islamic states or Muslim states or Arab states we have seen radical Islamists driven out or at least repressed severely. There is in today’s New York Times an account of what happened to Hama in Syria. It may be oddly enough that the people that can benefit from this would be the radical Islamist seeking to reestablish themselves in the Arabic states from which they have been excluded or from which they have been repressed simply by causing general destabilization throughout that part of the world.

Bishirjian: Dr. Yayla?

Yayla: We soon forget that empire makers is very common in the Islamic world and I am

sure many people will at least feel a moderate obsession with what happened last week. As to who will benefit in Islamic countries, I think, governments will benefit more. Governments will use this as a tool to stop Islamic movements severely and might hearing this is relax the society for tradition in Islamic countries and among the many reasons, one of the most important ones is the political governance patterns in those countries.

Bishirjian: In terms of the group around Bin Laden, if you think about the activities on September 11<sup>th</sup>, there were at least 15 maybe 20 persons all of whom were apparently willing to die and yet we know that their preparations took years, not days. They lived in American society, in Western societies, and not a work of their planning got out. It strikes me as an extraordinary solidarity. Is there anything we can learn from that?

Allen: The first thing I learned from it is that we can be fairly sure that in this period of time in which we have been anticipating an American response the terrorist network that that the surest means to protect themselves from the American military power is to disperse to make the targets as invisible as possible. So we have to expect them to have dispersed and be dispersing worldwide. And now we know they can do so with a pretty high degree of security because of the fact of solidarity. This is an intelligence coup of a kind on their part. They can maintain that degree of control and we have to assume therefore there are also at least as many in this country, the United States, as were here to carry out the first act. So that means that this is going difficult effort. It is not simply going to be military effort abroad. It is going to be continuing effort of intelligence, investigation and anticipation here in the United States.

Bishirjian: Dr. Yayla?

Yayla: As long as this kind of groups stay in small groups it may be difficult to infiltrate and they can keep their secret, I think. But two years seems too long to me to keep your secret for two years is something incredible.

Allen: That is certainly true. However, this is a remarkable accomplishment. It has to be noted and then we have to assume that whatever degree of organization that make it possible can make still more possible. And we must remind ourselves that this degree of organization is accomplished in an atmosphere in which this very network, the al-Qaeda, was under watch and the investigation as the result of the Embassy bombing in Africa. They were able to accomplish this even when they were already spotlighted.

Yayla: That's true.

Allen: Now, perhaps we should ask the question; how far the United States is going to go.

Yayla: Before entering into that question, maybe it would be appropriate to say a few words about civil society, about the traditions in other countries. If it is okay, I'd like to say a few words.

Allen: Yes, please do.

Yayla: As we all know, to have a stable democracy we need a strong civil society, and platform within which individuals and other segments of society can take care of themselves. They can solve their problems and they are expected to take responsibility for the own lives, decisions, choices. Unfortunately, such a tradition of civil society is either very vague, or does not exist, in many Islamic countries due to many reasons--cultural reasons, sociological reasons, political reasons, and in these countries, including mine, people expect to be looked after, to be directed, sometimes manipulated, by the public authorities and instead of making their livings, to make ends meet through their efforts, they expect hand downs from authorities. This is very bad, but ironically political authorities, those who have authority, also do not want to see a civil society flourishing because such an event might threaten their dominance over the country, if not in the short term, but in the long term, certainly.

There is a way to prove what I am saying is the study of the legal system regulating associations of these Islamic countries. You see that these are devised or designed not to let civil society flourish. You know in those countries the government doesn't want its civilians to do something to succeed at something. So in this case if you are not allowed to use political channels and if you are not allowed to change power at different levels there's only one option--you direct your energy, your hate, your effort to an outside power and it is very comforting, it gives you success and in such an environment there can be no democracy. And people who are raised in these cultures do not expect change, of course, and people in such an atmosphere can be turned into body bombs easily, as we have witnessed it.

So this event has many sides. One is security side, or the direction of to crush terrorist group. Of course, we have to do this, but if we want to have a long term solution we should turn our attention to civil society traditions in Islamic countries. Otherwise, there are many people in Islamic countries and the population of world trades is very high that means that the world can be divided into two kinds. This is very serious, I'm afraid civil society can come through this, which is something I never want to see actually.

Allen: Yes, when you explain this which you have done with such clarity then you also further a goal which I had in mind in asking how far the United States may need to

go. Because what you are suggesting is not simply a question of a military victory. That one has to be engaged in some manner in helping to order a part of the world which is right now chaotic and in which the people do not have the protections of civil society. And in which it is almost impossible to separate out the terrorist from the ordinary citizen. That's going to require us to do things which I don't think we have contemplated doing certainly not through the twentieth century. The United States has been the anti-imperial great power in the modern world and it's a question whether it can continue to be anti-imperial, if its going to defend itself.

Bishirjian: Let's address that in a couple of levels if we can. Dr. Yayla.

Martino: Before you get off of that, Dick, may I say some things about how far we should go?

Bishirjian: Yes, please, Dr. Martino.

Martino: First of all, presenting this from a just war perspective, first of all, one of the primary requirements for whatever we do is competent authority. And under the Constitution of the United States, that means Congress. If this is war, Congress has to declare it. The President can't do it on his own. Otherwise, you have violated a "just war" right from the beginning. And a second problem that arises when people start saying Awe ought to declare war@ there is a whole long list of emergency powers that come into existence with a declaration of war. They are already on the books just waiting for a declaration of war and while they might make sense in a World War II type mobilization they do not make sense in the kind of long term, low level, activity that's probably going to be needed for dealing with this problem. So we must be very, very careful about saying we've got to declare war. No, I don't think we want to do that we want to do something else short of declaring war but giving the, letting Congress give the executive authority to take the actions needed.

Allen: Yes, at which it has done. And I might point out that it's not only can one not simply declare war without being able to name a constituted authority which is the object of that war, the target.

Martino: Who's the bad guy. Yes. Let me know.

Allen: The declaration of war requires that you state the enemy's name. And the enemy must be an organized political power. So that seems to be unworkable, but it is also true that the nation must defend itself. And when it finds itself under attack a president really has the obligation to launch that defense. That is not to be impeded by the need for deliberation, and deliberation should take place as speedily as possible. It should be under civilian guidance. But defense is imperious, the rule of necessity must prevail.

Martino: Well, we already have laws on the books for that. In fact, when I was at the War College and Congress passed the War Powers Act, we all cheered. That means the president has 30 days to let us win, or else he has to explain to Congress.

Allen: That's right.

Martino: But if I may go further with a "just war" consideration, a second one is "just cause." Certainly, I think we have that, but one of the ramifications of just cause is that we don't have to wait for another attack, we don't have to engage in "tit for tat." Under just cause, we are entitled, justified in going after the terrorist infrastructure root and branch wherever it's to be found. This is not a case of another nation. This is a subversive organization no matter where it is so, we are entitled to go after it, wherever it is. And the third requirement which I think has a lot of ramifications is "right intention."

Allen: Yes.

Martino: Which includes among other things the intention not to harm innocent people.

Allen: Yes.

Martino: We have to have right intentions which to start with includes not harming innocent people. And furthermore means whatever action we take be such that it doesn't create resentment and fuel a further war. We are probably never going to end terrorism completely, but we oughtn't do things that provide people with an excuse for continuing it.

Allen: That is certainly true but we must always remember that war is a very blunt instrument.

Martino: Yes, it is.

Allen: Very blunt.

Bishirjian: Let's pick up from Dr. Allen's observation that we are at on the cusp of a new century. We seem to have inherited a great deal of responsibility in our previous Constitutional structure, the current one, hopefully is one of limited government and of limited interests or containment of our interest. That is we don't have an interest everywhere. We have only American interests that we pursue.

Allen: Yes.

Bishirjian: But what you are suggesting Dr. Allen is that the, as we move forward, we get

caught up in responding to the exigencies on the world that we could become an imperial power.

Allen: I think there is no doubt about it. That we may be drawn into this unwillingly because I don't think there is a disposition in the United States to undertake that role. But I don't think that we will be able to respond to the to the requisites of defense without in some degree undertaking that role in that part of the world.

Bishirjian: And that could have consequences for civil liberties in the United States?

Allen: It is certainly possible. But, one would hope that we could cabinet away from our domestic shores. But, frankly, terrorism is worldwide. It's greatest effect is accomplished here through infiltration and therefore some of the attention must be given here. I will say this though, the more completely we restore order in the part of the world from which the terrorist emanate, the more surely we can retain civil liberties at home. That is the paradox.

Bishirjian: Does my listening to the President, again I had the very distinct impression that it is his intention to overthrow the government of Afghanistan. Did I read that incorrectly?

Allen: I read that to be the case and I will go beyond that and say I read that to be the case wherever we find host countries that will not reform themselves speedily and control the problem within their borders. They, too, will be eligible for such overthrow. That's what I understand the President to be saying. I think he is operating on the simple principle, that we cannot control people in other countries except under the authority of war. And therefore if they do not control their citizens once they have attacked the United States, then the United States has an obligation to hold the government responsible for its failures.

Martino: How do we go about doing that? I point to the example of Haiti where we replaced a democratically elected president who turned out to be worse than the military government that overthrew him in the first place.

Allen: That is certainly true. I wrote about that sad case years ago when we first did it. We did it under false pretenses. We did not, in fact, accept our responsibilities in carrying out the overthrow of the previous regime and installing a new one. We were even complicit in causing some of the refugee flow that made it appear we needed to act. In other words, our government pursuit of policy there which was simply wrong from start to finish and was not predicated on the simple rule that President Bush is now making very clear, namely as Dr. Bishirjian has said, this is defense of U.S. interest. It is not in defense of multi-literalism, it is not in defense of the international community. Those may all benefit, and the President will

certainly that rhetorical advantage of the possibility for benefiting others. But he is making very clear he is defending U. S. interests. That played no role in our action in Haiti and our action in Haiti was a complete failure, along with most foreign policies of the eight years.

Martino: Well, let's go beyond that. I was reading in this mornings Wall Street Journal criticism in fact of Colin Powell. It's his fault we didn't go all the way to Baghdad, but if we had we would still have troops in Baghdad fighting Bedouins who didn't like us, whether they liked Saddam Hussein or not.

Bishirjian: However we hear Saddam Hussein has joined the fight, right.

Allen: Yes.

Bishirjian: How do we go about imposing a government that the people will like?

Allen: I cannot answer that question. I cannot say people will like what happens to them although we can judge from American history the few cases where we have had to do such things. That in general the people have come to like it.

Martino: Well again, I point to Central America where we did a lousy job in Nicaragua.

Allen: Yes.

Martino: We just don't have a good record of exploiting democracy and imposing decent governments on other countries.

Allen: That's true but don't forget Japan which was a very different story than all these other stories.

Martino: True, it is one of the shining examples, it and post World War II Germany.

Allen: Precisely, and the difference, or course, is in the Central American areas and Haiti you had American interventions and mock assertions of American control. A very important difference.

Bishirjian: So in other words, we could adopt the Roman policy?

Allen: Yes. Let me just say one other thing about this which Dr. Yayla (I can't get the punctuation right, you will have to forgive me) from Turkey can certainly confirm this. We must remember we are talking about a part of the world which was fairly completely dominated by the Ottomans up until virtually 1920. It hasn't been very long since these have been independent states in that part of the world. They are

accustomed to being subject to rigid administrations from outside. Is that not correct?

Yayla: I am not sure.

Bishirjian: Well, the Soviet Union accomplished that for a number of years. But I guess the issue here is, getting back to my initial observation, even though the United States in the last hundred years has been subjected to the acid of, for a lack of a better term, could be called cultural decay. Certainly the forces of relativism have affected our leadership classes. In these moments of crisis, we really discover that the American people are immensely strong and resilient. And I like to think of them as almost living in the, living embodiments, of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Americans who made this country.

Martino: The Wall Street Journal this morning pointed out that flag waving is no longer a pejorative term.

Allen: And beyond it, I think Dr. Bishirjian certainly has a point that many of those of us in the academy have wondered if the corroding effect of cultural relativism, moral relativism, have not destroyed the inner core of the American commitment to freedom. Since without a commitment to defend it, it's hard to retain the commitment itself. And I think we do see healthy signs that people are able to make distinctions, and willing stand up and defend fundamental principles. And if that is the case I think that is a good thing for us now to learn.

Bishirjian: Well, in terms of our own learning experience and one of the great things about a democracy is that we learn political things from our own experience by trial and error, what are we going to learn let's say if this takes the next five years of engagement, and militarily and imposing temporary government, military regimes, whatever, what are we learning from that?

Allen: Oh, boy! You know that question is so fraught. Let's say we learn one thing at the onset. We learn that it is still possible in a world where we thought it was disappearing to defend justice.

Martino: But is there the hope that we learn patience?

Allen: Well it is going to take that. I liked that expression at the close of the president's speech when he went to patient justice. He said many formulations, that one probably is the most meaningful. But we will learn to defend it, rather than to begin to bow to what are said to be cultural differences from region to region. We have had a problem with that in recent years. What we learn beyond that in terms of practical political rules or utilities, that's going to be an open question. I think it

might certainly refashion domestic politics in the United States.

Bishirjian: How so?

Allen: The kinds of things that people will argue about may change. If this lasts for five years, and if we retain any of the degree of fervor with which we are now watching it, people are not going to be quite so blithe in arguing about even the domestic agenda. The statement "It's the economy stupid," will simply not carry as much credibility and authority as it did previously because people will have a far richer appreciation of the uncertainties of political life. Defending a free society in an un-free world can never be again be predicated on easy assumptions that this progress and prosperity is going to go on forever unchallenged. No one shall ever think that again.

Martino: Not in a generation anyway.

Allen: Yes.

Bishirjian: Gentlemen, are there any other thoughts you would like to make? I will give each of you a chance. Dr. Yayla, thank you very much for joining us.

Yayla: My pleasure.

Bishirjian: And also we have that you will continue to participate in our affairs giving us the benefit of your knowledge and perspective on your part of the world.

Yayla: My pleasure, thank you very much.

Bishirjian: Dr. Martino.

Martino: I think my final thought would be, if we are going to defend ourselves we must recognize that civil liberties are an important part of the "ourselves" we are defending. I'm disturbed by polls that show that people are willing to give up civil liberties in exchange for security and the history of the world shows that doesn't work, you end up losing both. So I think it is very important that we stick to our guns, civil liberties are important even if they appear to expose us to risks. I mean, consider the absurdity of people now getting on airplanes have to put their nail clippers in their checked luggage. Well, that is absurd, it would not have made any difference. Yet this is the kind of thing we can expect to see imposed on us an ever larger scale, if people are willing to trade civil liberties for the appearance of security.

Bishirjian: Dr. Allen.

Allen: I think, Dr. Martino, certainly accurately prefigures the kinds of choices we are going to have to make and that's perhaps a good way to conclude this discussion.

The defense of liberty always comes at cost. And the close of the Declaration of Independence reminds us of that. And I suppose it's at moments when we are contemplating those costs that we realize that we have to have hierarchies of liberties. And when those who launched the Revolutionary War pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honors, they were reviewing what the scale was. Liberty was the most important thing. There are other important things one would give up in order to defend liberty. In these times themselves we thought of as liberties. But no liberty is more fundamental than the liberty to determine one's course of life among a free people in a form of government to which one should submit and give allegiance.

Bishirjian: Well, thank you very much gentlemen. I thank the listening audience. Please keep in mind that Yorktown University is named after the Battle of Yorktown in Virginia which culminated the Revolutionary War in the fight for liberty in American soil. Thank you again, and we look forward to hearing from you at our next web cast.